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301 
Comment on Ribstein’s  
Incorporating the Hendricksons 
Robert C. Ellickson  
I am saddled with the handicap of knowing little about ―Big 
Love,‖ the HBO television series that inspired Larry Ribstein’s title. 
Because Ribstein’s subject is the legal organization of domestic 
associations, particularly untraditional ones such as the polygamous 
marriage depicted in ―Big Love,‖ I am nonetheless confident that his 
playful allusion is apt. 
American states, in the aggregate, offer several standard forms for 
marital relations: conventional marriage, covenant marriage, and civil 
union. The states similarly provide individuals setting up a business 
association with a short menu of default organizational forms, 
including the general partnership, the limited partnership, the 
corporation, and the limited liability company. Legal scholars who 
are dissatisfied with the conventional marriage form have 
understandably considered the desirability of entitling marriage 
partners to structure their relationships partly, or entirely, according 
to one of these business templates. In his insightful essay, Ribstein 
evaluates the merits of these thought experiments. His central 
conclusion is that the relations among domestic partners are 
sufficiently different from relations among business partners that a 
direct transplant of forms from one of these domains to the other 
would be unwise.
1
 I agree. Should the grip of currently conventional 
conceptions of marriage loosen, however, Ribstein also predicts that 
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 1. Larry E. Ribstein, Incorporating the Hendricksons, 35 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 273 
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the two types of forms ultimately might converge.
2
 This I deem 
improbable.   
Two landmark articles, both cited by Ribstein, help clarify the 
analysis of standard legal forms. The first is Thomas Merrill and 
Henry Smith’s classic exploration of the Numerus Clausus principle.3 
Merrill and Smith assert that parties contemplating entry into an oft-
encountered social or business arrangement commonly prefer to 
make use of a standard legal form to reduce the transaction costs that 
they will bear at the outset and also during the course of their 
relationship. Merrill and Smith’s central new insight was that it may 
be unwise for a legal system to approve an additional standard form 
because a proliferation of forms may increase outsiders’ information 
costs.
4
 For example, when law places too few constraints on the 
forms of ownership of land, an entrepreneur may be deterred from 
attempting an otherwise worthwhile land assemblage. Merrill and 
Smith contend that lawmakers therefore should strive to provide an 
optimal number of standard forms—enough to give transactors an 
ample range of starting templates, but not so many as to create 
inordinate informational burdens.
5
 Ribstein shares these sentiments. 
He concludes that the law should provide multiple standard forms in 
both the business and marital contexts, but only so long as both 
menus remain short and (implicitly) that no particular form appear on 
both menus.
6
   
In addition, Ribstein succinctly and insightfully canvases the basic 
problems a standard form on either of these two menus must address. 
These include formalities of creation, procedures for termination, 
participants’ duties one another, and so on. An analyst, when 
considering the merits of a form’s specific rules on one of these 
matters, can benefit from keeping in mind Ian Ayres and Robert 
Gertner’s fundamental distinction between a default rule and an 
immutable rule.
7
 Lawmakers in a society generally devoted to 
 
 2. Ribstein, supra note 1, at 297–300. 
 3. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of 
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000).  
 4. Id. at 24–35. 
 5. Id. at 38–41. 
 6. Ribstein, supra note 1, at 298–99. 
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freedom of contract commonly are willing to entitle parties to treat a 
particular rule in a given legal template as a mere default that they are 
free to customize. Prospective marriage partners, for example, may 
be able to modify some of the default rules of marriage by means of a 
prenuptial agreement. Lawmakers, however, also sometimes forbid 
the alteration of certain rules incorporated in a standard form. They 
may make these rules immutable because either they are paternalistic 
or they want to protect outsiders who have stakes in the relationship 
that the parties are creating. For instance, the law may constrain the 
terms of a prenuptial agreement to protect the welfare of minor 
children.  
It is useful to consider the sorts of assets that marriage partners 
might transfer to a marital corporation, a topic that Ribstein does not 
broach. Here, a useful conceptual starting point is Hansmann and 
Kraakman’s thesis that the main purpose of current business law is to 
allow an individual to partition assets used in the domestic sphere 
from assets used in a particular business sphere.
8
 By incorporating 
their marriage, the Hendricksons would cloud the distinction between 
these two domains. In the purest of thought experiments, they would 
transfer all of their major domestic assets, whether previously owned 
separately or concurrently, to their newly created business entity. 
These assets would include their separate and joint financial 
accounts, entitlements to future wage and pension income, and 
capital goods such as their houses,
9
 furniture, and vehicles. In the 
purest scenario, they would also obtain judicial approval to transfer to 
the new corporation their rights and duties with regard to minor 
children. (This is not possible under current statutes, which entitle 
only a natural person to adopt, or have custody of, a child.)
10
 The 
Hendricksons would also probably want the documents governing 
 
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 87–88 (1989). 
 8. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 
110 YALE L.J. 387, 393–94 (2000). 
 9. No law prohibits marital partners from establishing a corporation or other closely-held 
business entity to own their primary residence. Land records reveal, however, that married 
couples almost never do this. In addition to the other shortcomings of incorporation that I soon 
canvass, federal, state, and local tax laws all typically disfavor transferring a marital home to a 
business association.   
 10. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-103 (2000) (addressing adoption); id. § 25-401 
(addressing custody). 
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their corporate entity to alter some of the default rules of corporate 
law. For example, if the documents did not limit the free transfer of 
shares, a disgruntled marital partner could unilaterally bring in a 
stranger as a substitute. 
An experienced attorney, if asked by the Hendricksons to set up a 
corporation along these lines, certainly would advise against it. A 
first reason for wariness, which does not go to the heart of the idea, is 
the high costs of pioneering a new legal form in a context where 
other forms are well-entrenched. With little guidance from others’ 
experiences, the Hendrickson spouses would have to decide who 
should serve as the corporation’s board members and officers, how 
decision-making authority should be divided among them, and how 
formal their internal procedures should be. More importantly, 
outsiders who first encountered the Hendrickson Marital Corporation 
would likely be flummoxed. For example, suppose the Corporation 
were to apply for a mortgage loan to help finance the purchase of a 
new residence to be occupied by some or all of the marriage partners. 
Most mortgage lenders, bewildered by the unconventional form of 
the applicant, would be chary of getting involved in such a deal.
11
 
Many government officials would also likely be baffled. The Internal 
Revenue Service, for example, might have to decide which taxpayer, 
if any, would be entitled to claim one of the children transferred to 
the corporation as a dependent for income tax purposes. 
These sorts of problems are merely transitional and their severity 
might abate with the passage of time. Ribstein rightly concentrates 
his discussion on the more fundamental question of whether an 
organizational form devised for the relatively impersonal and 
untrusting world of business is inherently unsuited for transplantation 
to the more intimate domestic sphere. Ribstein detects a number of 
fundamental differences between a conventional marital relationship 
and a conventional business relationship.
12
 Three of these differences 
warrant emphasis.  
 
 11. The condominium form of ownership, for example, was not well accepted in the 
United States until a decade after state legislatures had first authorized its use. Henry 
Hansmann, Condominium and Cooperative Housing: Transactional Efficiency, Tax Subsidies, 
and Tenure Choice, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 25, 28–30, 62–63 (1991). 
 12. Ribstein understandably makes no mention of marital partners’ expectations about 
engagement in sexual relations. Now that premarital sex has become so common, sexual 
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First, as Margaret Brinig has stressed, individuals who enter into a 
marriage typically contemplate that theirs will be an unconditional 
relationship, one potentially encompassing every aspect of their 
lives.
13
 In a successful marriage, spouses benefit from mutual 
interactions across a wide spectrum of activities. In practice, of 
course, few marriages are all-encompassing. A spouse, for example, 
may maintain separate friendships and hobbies and own some assets 
as an individual. But, even with that qualification, participants 
typically expect a conventional marital relationship to be far different 
from a business relationship, which conventionally calls for only a 
partial commitment in a limited sphere. In particular, marriage vows 
conventionally include unqualified promises of mutual aid—in the 
form of care and emotional and financial support—should 
unemployment, bad health, old age, or other misfortune strike one of 
the partners.
14
 When Ribstein states that marriage involves a 
―personal support structure,‖15 he is alluding to the unconditional 
nature of the marriage relationship. 
Second, a significant fraction of those who marry anticipate using 
their new relationship as a foundation for the titanic task of raising 
young children. An unconditional and all-encompassing relationship 
such as marriage is a particularly propitious base for undertaking a 
challenge so long-lasting and complex. Lawmakers’ concerns about 
the forms of marital institutions largely stem from the potentially 
strong interconnection between marriage and child-rearing. Extant 
marital forms therefore reflect not only spouses’ preferences but also 
legislators’ solicitude for the welfare of children. A standard business 
form, unlike a marital form, of course provides no guidance on 
participants’ relations with children. 
Third, knowing that marriage is an unconditional relationship, a 
person is unlikely to enter wedlock without already having what 
Ribstein calls ―strong-form trust‖ in their future partner.16 Many of 
 
relations are not as closely bound up with the marital relationship as they were a century ago.   
 13. BRINIG, supra note 1, at 79. 
 14. In many contexts, the family is another important vehicle for the provision of mutual 
aid. Although a single person may be able to call on relatives for support in a pinch, marriage 
commonly provides an additional, and more efficacious, form of informal insurance. 
 15. Ribstein, supra note 1, at 287. 
 16. See id. at 283. When a marriage is arranged by parents, as is still common in less 
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the default rules in a standard business form, by contrast, presume 
that the co-venturers are wary of one another. These rules are ill-
suited for transplantation to the domestic sphere. A robust right of 
exit, as Ribstein explains, makes more sense when trust is weak than 
when it is strong. The standard default rules governing corporations 
also typically impose formalities, such as scheduled meetings of the 
board of directors, to reassure the untrusting. Those who share a deep 
trust would regard compliance with these formalities to be not only a 
waste of time but also potentially corrosive. A business form signals 
social distance and coldness. A marital form signals intimacy and 
warmth.
17
 Imagine the emotions of a child who had to turn over a 
report card from primary school to a corporate officer for a signature. 
I thus agree with Ribstein that a conventional business 
relationship inherently differs from a conventional marital 
relationship. The menus of legal forms that apply to these 
relationships do not, and should not, overlap. The immutable rules 
appropriate in the two contexts are different. It is true, of course, that 
many of the rules that attach to both domestic and business forms are 
defaults that a drafter could alter. Even so, it invariably is cheaper for 
a drafter to start drafting from a template that most closely fits the 
relationship at hand. For the Hendricksons, that template would be a 
marriage form, not a business form.  
Dramatic changes in social norms conceivably might, as Ribstein 
speculates, make this analysis obsolete. The institution of marriage 
currently has great appeal to adults who value the prospect of 
entering into an unconditional and trusting relationship that may 
provide, among other advantages, a robust form of social insurance 
and a promising platform for raising children. I myself cannot 
imagine a world where people, and their lawmakers, would not 
highly value an institution that offered so much. Convergence, to my 
mind, is unlikely. Instead, to borrow from William Faulkner, I predict 
 
developed nations, it may be that the trusting parties are the parents, not the newlyweds. 
 17. Margaret Brinig prefers to call the mutual disposition of marital partners love, not 
trust. See BRINIG, supra note 1, at 79. 
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that the warm institution of marriage will not only endure, but also 
prevail over the forces that push to make it cold.
18
 
 
 18. Cf. William Faulkner, Nobel Prize Acceptance Speech (Dec. 10, 1950), in NOBEL 
LECTURES: LITERATURE 1901–1967, at 445 (Horst Frenz ed., 1969), available at http://nobel 
prize.org/nobel_prizes/literature/laureates/1949/faulkner-speech.html (―I believe that man will 
not merely endure: he will prevail.‖).    
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